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SUPER HIGHWAY ROBBERY: THE SEC AND THE EVOLUTION 
OF ONLINE SECURITIES FRAUD 
 
Sean A. Kennedy
1
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: 
 
The Security and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) was formally created and 
empowered through Section 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “’34 Act”)2 as 
well as the 1933 Securities Act (the “’33 Act.”)3  One of the main purposes of the SEC is 
to regulate the registration and sale of securities in the primary and secondary markets.
4
  
The SEC was created as a response from the government to the Great Depression of 
1929.
5
  Thus, it is unsurprising that the legislators who passed these Acts did not foresee 
the radical changes that the creation of the internet and onset of the digital age would 
bring to the securities market.   
In 2011, over 2.4 billion people across the world accessed the Internet.6  
Moreover, it is estimated that “users access about 100 billion web pages every day.”7  
                                                        
1
 The author would be remiss without formally expressing his thanks and gratitude to E. 
Judson Jennings, Professor of the Legal Issues in Online Communities Writing Seminar.  
This paper would not have been possible without his patience, understanding, and 
encouragement.  
2
 See generally, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains 
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml. 
3
 Id. 
4
 Id. 
5
 Id. 
6
 Trautman, Lawrence James, The SEC & the Internet: Regulating the Web of Deceit 
(October 29, 2011). Consumer Finance Law Quarterly Report, Vol. 65, 2011. Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1951148.  
7
 Id. (citing Rod Beckstrom, President & CEO, Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and 
Numbers, Keynote Address at TUTED World Telecom Day: ICANN and the Global 
Internet (May 17, 2011) (transcription available at, 
 2 
This increase in Internet usage has facilitated the ability to commit securities fraud. To 
illustrate, as of 2001 the SEC had brought a total of 209 internet related enforcement 
actions for fraud.
8
  Last year alone, the SEC brought 735 enforcement actions against 
corporations and individuals.
9
  It is estimated that over two-thirds of all the current cases 
brought by the SEC are related to some type of internet-based fraud.
10
  
Initially, SEC regulators had split opinions regarding the impact the Internet 
would have in the future of securities fraud enforcement.  Some at the SEC believed that 
the current system of enforcement laws would be sufficient safeguards to handle the 
expansion of internet fraud, while others perceived this expansion as a threat to consumer 
safety.
11
  In 1997, John Stark, the Chief of the SEC’s Office of Internet Enforcement 
(“OIE,”) expressed his belief that the SEC did not need to promulgate any new laws in 
order to combat internet fraud.
12
  Specifically, he stated 
Most of the SEC's rules and regulations apply equally over the Internet as 
they would to any new medium. There is at present no desire on the behalf 
of the Division of Enforcement, or really as the SEC as a whole, for any 
new broad or overreaching types of regulations but from the enforcement 
side, the current antifraud provisions will do just fine.13  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
http://www.icann.org/en/presentations/beckstrom-speech-izmir- turkey-17may11-en.pdf)) 
(emphasis added). 
8
 Richard H. Walker & David M. Levine, "You've Got Jail": Current Trends in Civil and 
Criminal Enforcement of Internet Securities Fraud, 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 405, 409 
(2001). 
9
 See generally Press Release, Agency’s Fiscal Year Totals Show Most Enforcement 
Actions Filed in Single Year, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-234.htm (last 
updated Nov. 9, 2011).  
10
 Id. 
11
 Compare, infra, note 12; infra, note 14.  
12
 Michael J. Kaufman, 26 Sec. Lit. Damages §5:12 (updated September 2012) 
13
 Id. 
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Conversely, in 1999 the Director of the SEC’s Office of Enforcement, Richard Walker, 
noted “policing the Internet is unquestionably our greatest enforcement challenge 
today.”14 
This paper will take an in-depth look at the increase of securities fraud perpetrated 
over the Internet and the SEC’s response to these newfound threats in an effort to 
determine which of the divergent views expressed by the respective Directors was more 
accurate.  Part II of this paper will provide a background of the SEC’s enforcement 
ability framework that is used to bring actions against individuals that commit securities 
fraud.  Part III of this paper will look at the former and current trends in online securities 
fraud transactions.  Finally, Part IV of this paper will conclude by evaluating the internal 
effectiveness of the SEC as well as look at a privately funded program that can be used to 
identify and report online securities fraud schemes.   
 
II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE SEC’S ENFORCEMENT ABILITY: 
 
In order to fully understand the impact the evolution of the Internet has had upon 
the SEC, it is necessary to first look at the current legal framework that is used to bring 
enforcement actions against perpetrators of securities fraud.  The SEC has the ability to 
bring enforcement actions against individuals or companies that violate various portions 
of the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts, which relate to issuances and misrepresentations concerning 
securities.
15
  Collectively, these Acts protect both the initial issuance of securities when 
                                                        
14
 Byron D. Hittle, An Uphill Battle: The Difficulty of Deterring and Detecting 
Perpetrators of Internet Stock Fraud, 54 Fed. Comm. L.J. 165, 167 (2001) (quoting, 
Richard Walker).  
15
 The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, 
and Facilitates Capital Formation, supra, note 2. 
 4 
companies first attempt to register and sell them in the market, as well as the subsequent 
resale of these securities on the secondary market by traders and investors.
16
 
A threshold issue that courts consider during this process is determining what 
exactly constitutes a security.  The term “security” is defined broadly in both the ’33 and 
the ’34 Acts.17  Further, in SEC v. W.J. Howey, the Supreme Court stated that an 
investment contract, or, security, under the ’33 Acts is “a contract, transaction, or 
scheme, whereby a person invests money in a common enterprise and is led to expect 
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or third party.”18  Courts have relaxed the 
“solely” requirement of the Howey test and consider stocks to fall under the both the ’33 
and ’34 Acts definition of a security when they have “(i) the right to receive dividends 
contingent upon an apportionment of profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be 
pledged or hypothe-cated [sic]; (iv) the conferring of voting rights in proportion to the 
number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to appreciate in value.”19 
                                                        
16
 Id. 
17
 Both Acts define a security as “any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-
based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or 
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization 
[sic] certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust 
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or 
other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, 
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or 
based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on 
a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of interest or participation 
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to 
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.”  15 U.S.C.A. § 77b; 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c. 
18
 S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). 
19
 Robinson v. Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 173 (4th Cir. 2003).   
 5 
Again, the SEC generally brings enforcement actions for violations involving 
these securities under both the ’33 and ’34 Acts.20  Specifically, the ’33 Act is used to 
regulate conduct in the primary market wherein the impetus of the violation is the initial 
issuance of a security.
21
  Under Section 11 of the ’33 Act, the SEC may bring an action 
against any signee of a registration statement who makes a material misrepresentation or 
omission relating to the issuance of a security.
22
  Misrepresentations and omissions 
relating to the resale of securities on the secondary market are regulated by the ’34 Act.23  
The main antifraud provision used by the SEC to pursue violations under the ’34 Act is 
the 10(b)-5 provision.
24
  This provision states that 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course 
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.25 
 
Courts have determined that the requisite elements to bring a 10(b)-5 claim 
include: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a 
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a 
security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) 
                                                        
20
 See, supra note 2. 
21
 Id. 
22
 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k. 
23
 15 U.S.C.A. § 78b. 
24
 Trautman, supra note 6, at 39.  
25
 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
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loss causation.
26
  However, courts have recently placed the greatest emphasis on proving 
the element of materiality.
27
  
The Tenth Circuit weighed in on the determination of the materiality requirement 
under 10(b)-5 in cases involving online fraud.  In S.E.C. v. Curshen, an investor omitted 
the fact the he was being paid to promote a stock for a company.
28
  Further, the investor 
was making anonymous postings online with the intention of getting unsuspecting people 
to purchase the company’s stock he was being paid to tout.29  The court stated  
[t]hus, a voluntary statement invokes a duty to disclose only if it is 
material. A statement or omission is only material if a reasonable investor 
would consider it important in determining whether to buy or sell stock” 
and if it would have significantly altered the total mix of information 
available to current and potential investors.
30
 
 
The court determined that a reasonable investor would consider the motivation of the 
individual posting the information online as a “significant factor” in making a decision to 
invest and found the Defendant’s actions sufficient to rise to the level of material.31  
Once the SEC believes that it has enough facts to satisfy the materiality 
requirement it will proceed to bring a suit against alleged fraudsters.  However, the SEC 
only has the authority to bring civil suits against perpetrators of securities fraud.
32
  In 
order to bring criminal actions the SEC must cooperate with agencies such as the U.S 
                                                        
26
 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184, (2011). 
27
 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246, (1988) (finding ‘Fraud on the Market’ 
acceptable to prove reliance on a material misrepresentations);  see also Elieen Smith 
Ewing, Fraud on the Cybermarket: Liability for Hyperlinked Misinformation Under Rule 
10b-5, 56 Bus. Law. 375, 383 (2000) (“More recent decisions, however, have witnessed a 
certain telescoping of the necessary elements—only materiality appears to remain a 
requirement.”) 
28
 S.E.C. v. Curshen, 372 F. App'x 872, 874 (10th Cir. 2010). 
29
 Id. 
30
 Id. at 880 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
31
 Id. at 881. 
32
 Hittle, supra note 14, at 187. 
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Attorney’s Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigations or state enforcement agencies and 
convince those agencies to bring criminal charges.
33
  However, a criminal violation under 
10(b)-5 requires a higher degree of culpability than a civil infraction.
34
  In order to 
establish a criminal violation, “the Government must prove that a person willfully 
violated the provision,” whereas a civil action only requires the Government to prove 
mere recklessness.
35
  This is the established framework used by the SEC when it brings 
charges against individuals.  The following section will analyze cases brought by the SEC 
in order to determine if this current framework is adequate to protect investors from fraud 
in the modern internet age.  
 
III. TWO MAIN CATEGORIES OF INTERNET BASED SECURITIES FRAUD: 
  
The two main categories of internet based securities fraud are (1) market 
manipulation and (2) offering frauds.
36
  This section will explain in detail how these 
schemes operate as well as the devastating monetary effects they have on unsuspecting 
victims.  In addition, cases will be used to illustrate how the SEC initially responded to 
these violations during the beginning of the internet era and will be followed by cases 
examining how it currently responds to the modern versions of these schemes.  
Importantly, all of the actions by the SEC discussed in this Section are based upon the 
enforcement framework outlined in Section II.  
 
 
                                                        
33
 Id. 
34
 Walker, Levine, supra note 8, at 416-17. 
35
 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665 (1997). 
36
 Walker, Levine, supra note 8 at 410. 
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A. Market Manipulation: 
Market manipulation is generally defined as “the illegal practice of raising or 
lowering a security's price by creating the appearance of active trading.”37  The Supreme 
Court elaborated stating 
[Market manipulation] is and was virtually a term of art when used in 
connection with securities markets. It connotes intentional or willful 
conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or 
artificially affecting the price of securities.
38
 
 
Online market manipulation falls into two general categories: (1) the “Pump and Dump” 
and (2) the “Cyber-smear.”39  Both categories focus on the manipulation of already issued 
stock on the secondary market and the SEC generally prosecutes those who perpetrate 
these frauds for 10(b)-5 violations in connection with their participation in these 
schemes.
40
 
1. Pump and Dump Schemes 
 First, in a “pump and dump” scheme, the fraudster will purchase so-called “penny 
stocks”41 and begin to circulate false and misleading information across the Internet in 
order to drive up the price of the security.
42
  Fraudsters will make use of various 
pseudonyms and anonymous postings in order to create “buzz” for these otherwise 
worthless stocks.
43
  Once the price of the stock increases, the fraudster will sell his 
                                                        
37
 Manipulation, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). 
38
 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).   
39
 Walker, Levine, supra note 8 at 411. 
40
 Id. 
41
 A penny stock as “an equity security that is not traded in established markets, 
represents no tangible assets, or has average revenues less than required for trading on an 
exchange. Typically, a penny stock is highly speculative and can be purchased for less 
than $5 a share.” Stock, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). 
42
 Hittle, supra note 14, at 169. 
43
 Id. 
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interest in the stock, after it rises to a high point in order to turn a profit.
44
  Generally, 
after the fraudster sells his interest the stock, the price of the stock crashes and innocent 
investors suffer significant losses due to the rapid decline of the stock price.
45
  
Enforcement actions brought by the SEC generally are contingent upon the type of 
misrepresentations made by the fraudsters and the severity of the damage caused.
46
 
 In 1999, Jonathan Lebed committed one of the first newsworthy online “pump 
and dump” schemes when he was only fifteen years old.47  Lebed purchased various 
penny stocks and immediately begin spamming message boards on both Yahoo! Finance 
and Silicon Investor in order to manufacture demand for the stocks.
48
  In one instance, 
Lebed purchased 18,000 shares of a stock called MSHI for roughly $1.30 per share and 
immediately began to spam various message boards claiming it was “the most 
undervalued stock in history.”49  Shortly after, the stock price rose to roughly $4 per 
share and Lebed made nearly $34,000 in profits.50   
The SEC brought a 10(b)-5 action against Lebed and relied upon various actions 
taken by Lebed in order to bolster its position in establishing the materiality 
requirement.
51
  Specifically, the SEC focused on Lebed’s postings under various 
anonymous names and pseudonyms that were used to create the illusion that many 
                                                        
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. 
46
 Walker, Levine, supra note 8, at 412. 
47
 In re Jonathan G. Lebed, Exchange Act Release No. 34-43307, 2000 WL 1353040, 1 
(Sept. 20, 2000).  
48
 Id. at 2. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. 
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people, instead of just Lebed, were promoting the stock.52  Lebed insisted that his claims 
were innocuous and on par with what investors do everyday, but the Commission decided 
enough evidence existed to pursue a violation under the ’34 Act.53  This is important 
because it is indicative of what actions taken by fraudsters may rise to the level of 
materiality under 10(b)-5, instead of mere puffery, which is non actionable by the SEC.54 
Ultimately, Lebed settled out of court with SEC, admitted no fault, and forfeited 
$272,826 of profit.55  However, the SEC settlement only pertained to 11 out of 26 trades 
made by Lebed and it is believed that after litigation he earned over $500,000 in profit 
from these schemes.
56
  The Lebed case highlighted numerous problems the SEC initially 
faced with the rampant expansion of online securities fraud.  While the SEC was 
successful in pursuing litigation and ultimately reached a settlement with Lebed, the 
fraudster ended up retaining 65% of the earnings he procured through an illegal “pump 
and dump” scheme.57 
The use of websites is another popular way to perpetrate “pump and dump” 
schemes.
58
  These websites are sometimes referred to as “momentum trading” websites.59 
These website generally have misleading statements regarding a track record of stock 
predictions and will generate baseless claims regarding penny stocks the fraudsters are 
                                                        
52
 Id.  
53
 Id. 
54
 Howard v. Haddad, 962 F.2d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that puffery “lacks the 
materiality essential to a securities fraud allegation.”) 
55
 Hittle, supra note 14, at 187. 
56
 Id.  
57
 Id. 
58
 Walker, Levine, supra note 8, at 425. 
59
 Id. 
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trying to inflate.
60
  One example of this specific type of a “pump and dump” scheme 
involved law students creating a fraudulent website called, “Fast-Trade.com.”61  In the 
Fast-Trade.com case, the students used the website to manipulate the price of penny 
stocks leading some stocks to have upwards of a 700% increase in value.
62
  When the 
SEC discovered the fraud the students had already earned $345,000 in profit.63  The SEC 
brought charges against the students under section 10(b)-5 of the ’34 Act.64  Similar to 
the Lebed Case, the SEC focused on the specific actions of the student in creating the 
website to establish the 10(b)-5 materiality element.
65
  However, the SEC was not able to 
prove a high enough degree of intent to garner support for any criminal prosecution of the 
students.
66
 
Currently, “pump and dump” schemes are still widely utilized by fraudsters who 
commit securities fraud using the Internet.  One of the most popular ways to engage in 
“pump and dump” schemes is through targeting email spamming.67  A study conducted in 
order to determine the effectiveness of spam accounts found that “unsolicited e-mail 
accounts for over 80 percent of all Internet e-mail traffic, which amounts to over 1.6 
billion messages per week.”68  It is estimated that 15% of all current spam mail is related 
                                                        
60
 Id. 
61
 In The Matter Of Kenneth Terrell, Jason Wyckoff, Adam Altman And Joanne Colt, 
Exchange Act Release, No. 34-42483, 2000 WL 248549, 1 (March, 2, 200).  
62
 Id. at 2. 
63
 Id. 
64
 Id. at 9. 
65
 Id. 
66
 See generally, id. 
67
 Laura Frieder, Jonathan Zittrain, Spam Works: Evidence from Stock Touts and 
Corresponding Market Activity, 30 Hastings Comm. & Ent L.J. 479, 480 (2008).  
68
 Id. 
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to “pump and dump” stock schemes.69  In other words, nearly 240 million spam messages 
per week are sent out attempting to defraud legitimate investors.  
In a recent “pump and dump” case, two brother created a website called 
doublestocks.com to advertise a newsletter containing stock picks made by a “stock 
picking robot.”70  In reality, there was no “stock-picking robot” and the stocks listed in 
the newsletter consisted of penny stocks that were hand picked by the brothers.
71
  In 
addition, the brothers were paid by stock promoters to increase the value of various 
penny stocks.
72
  In total the brothers were paid over $1.8 million by various stock 
promoters for this service.
73
  The SEC brought a 10(b)-5 claim against the brothers and 
ordered them to disgorge all of their profits from the scheme.
74
 
The importance of this recent case is that it highlights how the SEC has not 
changed its course in pursing internet fraudsters.  The allegations and enforcement action 
brought against the brothers in the “stock picking robot” case are identical to the 
allegations brought against Jonathan Lebed in 2000, nearly 12 years ago.  As will be 
discussed in Section IV, the SEC has attempted to make internal changes to keep pace 
with the vast increase in fraud cases, however, its enforcement actions remain the same 
and it still cannot bring independent criminal actions against internet fraudsters.   
 
 
 
 
                                                        
69
 Id.  
70
 SEC v. Thomas Edward Hunter And Alexander John Hunter, Lit. Release No. 22339, 
2012 WL 1894183, 1 (April 20, 2012).  
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id.   
74
 Id. 
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2. “Cyber-Smear” Schemes: 
A close relative to the “pump and dump” scheme is the “cyber-smear” scheme.  A 
“cyber-smear” scheme for all intents and purposes is the inverse of a “pump and dump” 
scheme.
75
  In a “cyber-smear” scheme the fraudster will anonymously post false and 
misleading statements that will decrease the value of a particular stock in order to engage 
in a “short sale”76 and turn a profit.77  These schemes are prosecuted in a nearly identical 
manner to “pump and dump” schemes and involve the SEC bringing civil actions under 
the ’34 Act.78  Notably, “cyber-smear” schemes cases generally have a higher likelihood 
of criminal liability attaching because the cases involve a great deal of effort and intent 
on the part of the fraudster.
79
 
One early case that demonstrates the significant affect a “cyber-smear” attack has 
on unsuspecting companies is United States v. Mark Simeon Jakob.
80
  Initially, Mr. Jakob 
lost nearly $80,000 attempting various short sales of Emulex stock.81  In order to 
compensate himself for this loss he orchestrated a fake press release that claimed the 
CEO of Emulex was being investigated by the SEC and was about to resign from his 
                                                        
75
 Walker, Levine, supra note 8, at 412. 
76
 A short sale is “[a] sale of a security that the seller does not own or has not contracted 
for at the time of sale, and that the seller must borrow to make delivery.  Such a sale is 
usu[ally] made when the seller expects the security's price to drop.  If the price does drop, 
the seller can make a profit on the difference between the price of the shares sold and the 
lower price of the shares bought to pay back the borrowed shares.”  Sale, Black's Law 
Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). 
77
 Walker, Levine, supra note 8, at 412. 
78
 Id. 
79
 Id. at 420. 
80
 United States v. Mark Simeon Jakob, Lit. Release No. 16857, 2001 WL 15535, 1 (Jan. 
8, 2001). 
81
Id.  
 14 
position.
82
  The result of this press release was immediate and enormous.  It was 
estimated that Emulex lost over $2 billion in market share in less than a half an hour.
83
  
While the error was eventually fixed, countless investors lost money when the stock price 
began to free-fall.
84
   
The SEC brought a civil suit against Mr. Jacob and coordinated with the United 
States Attorneys Office (“USAO”) in order to bring criminal charges.85  Because of the 
impact of the damage to Emulex as well as the level of planning Mr. Jakobs put into the 
scheme he plead guilty to both the civil and criminal charges.
86
  Mr. Jakobs was 
sentenced to a “maximum prison term of 25 years, a maximum fine equal to two times 
the $110 million in investor losses and an order of restitution up to $110 million payable 
to the victims of his scheme.”87 
While this case provides a good example of how the SEC is able to successfully 
coordinate with another governmental entity in order to bring criminal charges against 
fraudster, this level of cooperation is not always possible.  In fact, certain courts have 
expressed concern that this type of dual investigation into a single defendant can run 
afoul of due process protections.  In United States v. Stringer, the Ninth Circuit 
considered a case where the SEC brought an action against a defendant while the USAO 
conducted a parallel investigation.
88
  Ultimately, the court determined that “there is 
nothing improper about the government undertaking simultaneous criminal and civil 
                                                        
82
 Id. 
83
 Id. 
84
 Id. 
85
 Jakob, supra note 80. 
86
 Id. 
87
 Id.  
88
 United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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investigations.”89  However, the court mentioned certain “rare” circumstances where 
these parallel investigations can interfere with defendants’ due process rights. The court 
stated 
[T]o the extent that the individual defendants may have been led through 
trickery or deceit to turn over documentary or physical evidence in their 
possession or to use their official authority to turn over evidence in the 
possession of the corporation, the defendants could state a claim under the 
Fourth Amendment.  A government official must not affirmatively 
mislead the subject of parallel civil and criminal investigations into 
believing that the investigation is exclusively civil in nature and will not 
lead to criminal charges.
90
 
 
Here, the SEC and the USAO cooperated within the proper framework when 
conducting the parallel investigations into Mr. Jakob.  However, it easy to see how these 
due process concerns can cause apprehension on the part of the SEC to involve other 
agencies into potential securities fraud investigations and vice-a-versa.  To surmise, in 
addition to having to keep up with the growing rate of internet based “pump and dump” 
and “cyber-smear” schemes committed by individuals, the SEC has to also attempt 
cooperate within a specified framework so as to not violate defendants due process rights 
and allow them to escape liability. 
B. Offerings Frauds: 
 An offerings frauds involves a type of scheme where an individual will set up a 
website or other mechanism in order to sell fraudulent securities.
91
  In a majority of these 
schemes, the securities never actually exist.92  Offerings frauds can originate from 
numerous other platforms.  As the Director of the SEC’s Office of Enforcement, Richard 
                                                        
89
 Id. 
90
 Id. at 940 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
91
 Walker & Levine, supra note 8, at 423. 
92
 Id. 
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Walker, stated, “[t]hese scams are often exotic.  For example, we have seen interests 
pitched in eel farms, coconut plantations, and, my personal favorite, projects to explore 
near earth asteroids.”93   
The Internet has streamlined this process, enabling operators of the scheme to be 
self-sufficient by simply setting up websites that offer fraudulent securities.
94
  In 1998, 
Matthew Bowin orchestrated one of the first offerings fraud schemes conducted entirely 
on the Internet.
95
  Bowin created a website to launch an IPO for a company named IPS.
96
  
This stock offering garnered over $190,000 from over 150 different investors.97  Bowin 
never issued any stock and instead spent all of the money on personal expenses such as 
groceries, electronics and bills.98  The SEC successfully brought a civil enforcement 
action against Bowin who was convicted on 54 different counts including fraud and 
grand theft.
99
  In addition, state law enforcement successfully pursued criminal charges 
that resulted in a 10-year prison sentence.
100
 
Perhaps the most commonly known type of offerings fraud is a Ponzi scheme.
101
  
The general function of a Ponzi scheme involves the payment of alleged returns to 
                                                        
93
 Richard H. Walker, Remarks at the National Press Club: A Bull Market in Securities 
Fraud? (Apr. 5, 1999), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch265.txt. 
94
 Hittle, supra note 14, at 169. 
95
 SEC v. Interactive Products and Services, Inc., and Matthew P. Bowin, Lit. Release 
No. 15700, 1998 WL 159331, 1 (Apr. 8, 1998).  
96
 Id. 
97
 Id. 
98
 Id.  
99
 California v. Matthew P. Bowin, Lit. Release No. 16029, 1999 WL 18570 (Jan. 19, 
1999). 
100
 Id. 
101
 Walker & Levine, supra note 8, at 423. 
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current investors through the funds collected by new investors in the scheme.
102
  The 
operator of the scheme will use the money collected from the new investors in order to 
create the illusion of high, fixed returns.103  This requires a constant inflow of funds to 
keep the façade of earnings present or else the scheme collapses on itself.
104
  The Ponzi 
scheme derives its name from the infamous confidence man Charles Ponzi who 
defrauded numerous investors in the 1920s by promising a 50% return on an investment 
based upon international reply coupons for postage stamps.
105
  This return was 45% 
higher than any bank that invested in a similar security.
106
  Once the cash flows slowed 
down, Ponzi was unable to pay current investors and the whole operation fell apart.107 
 Currently, offerings fraud cases result in greatly increased damages to investors.  
In 2011, the SEC brought down a Ponzi scheme operating entirely online that lost nearly 
$600 million.
108
  In that case, Paul Burks and his company Rex Venture Group, used the 
website ZeekRewards.com to lure investors into purchasing securities that did not exist.
109
  
The website claimed that investors would receive 50% of the company’s earnings 
through a profit sharing system.
110
  In reality, all of the funds were collected and 
distributed using the classic Ponzi scheme model.  When the SEC discovered the fraud, 
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the scheme was on the brink of collapse.
111
  In one month alone, the website had $162 
million incoming from investors and nearly $160 million that needed to be paid out to 
investors.
112
 
 The SEC investigation revealed that there is currently $225 million still 
outstanding.
113
  Burks has reached a private settlement with the SEC that required him to 
pay a $4 million fine, relinquish his interest in Rex Venture Group, and work with a court 
appointed receiver that will “collect, marshal, manage and distribute remaining assets for 
return to harmed investors.”114  Interestingly, this settlement with the SEC allowed Burks 
to claim no wrongdoing in connection with the scheme.
115
 
 This case illustrates the main issue with the SEC’s current ability to protect 
investors from becoming victims of online securities fraud.  While the SEC can 
successfully bring enforcement actions and cooperate with state and federal authorities in 
pursuing criminal actions, these are all “after the fact” remedies.  Whether it is a “pump 
and dump” scheme, a “cyber-smear” campaign or a classic Ponzi scheme, the SEC is 
taking reactive steps while fraudsters collect larger and larger profits from engaging in 
the same schemes they have perpetrated for years. 
 
IV. THE SEC’S INTERNAL EVOLUTION AND PROGRAMS IT SHOULD 
CONSIDER ADOPTING: 
 
 
 The final section of this paper will address the internal changes the SEC has made 
in order to keep pace with the growth of the internet and will suggest certain programs 
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used by private parties to detect internet fraud that the SEC should look into adopting.  
While the regulation currently enacted by the SEC does not impede its ability to 
prosecute fraudsters, a close look into the internal process of the SEC’s enforcement 
divisions should to shed light on how efficiently the SEC can detect these schemes before 
fraudsters can harm investors.  
A. EDGAR: 
The SEC’s first response to the growing popularity of the Internet was its creation 
of a centralized database used to gather information on filings required by corporations in 
securities trading.
116
  This program is called the Electronic, Data Gathering, and Analysis 
Retrieval System (“EDGAR”).117  The SEC has stated that 
[EDGAR’s] primary purpose is to increase the efficiency and fairness of 
the securities market for the benefit of investors, corporations, and the 
economy by accelerating the receipt, acceptance, dissemination, and 
analysis of time-sensitive corporate information filed with the agency.
118
 
 
In 1993, the SEC began a phase in process that moved EDGAR from being a voluntary 
process to the more familiar current day requirement for many, but not all, fillings for 
domestic public companies to ensure compliance with SEC filing regulations.
119
  
Regulation S-T governs the requirements and instructions for what must be filed 
electronically, including the application for hardship exceptions, as well as instructions 
for compliance and is available in the EDGAR Filer Manual.
120
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 However, the EDGAR system does have inherent drawbacks.  Certain documents 
cannot currently be posted on EDGAR due to internal SEC policies.
121
  Further, a number 
of documents on EDGAR are voluntary, not mandatory, leading to inconsistent filings 
form one company to another depending upon which documents certain companies are 
able to afford, or choose, to put online.
122
  While this was the correct initial step for the 
SEC to take in order to adapt to the oncoming internet based culture, it has failed to keep 
the system progressing with the current state of the internet and its users. 
B. The Office of Internet Enforcement: 
The SEC’s next major move in response to the increase of internet fraud cases 
was the establishment of a specialized enforcement division the OIE.
123
  The goal of this 
division was to facilitate a “concentrated effort in investigating Internet security fraud 
and act as a civil-enforcement agency, usually looking for fines and injunctions.”124  
Initially the OIE had nearly 70 attorneys and staff members working to detect internet 
schemes through simple internet searches.
125
  This division was nicknamed “Cyberforce” 
and grew to include well over 200 SEC attorneys conducting independent searches for 
fraudulent activity online.
126
  While this program relied heavily on volunteers and manual 
searches, Richard Walker, the Director of the OIE, touted the programs initial success.127  
By late 2001, the Cyberforce sweeps had accounted for 209 enforcement actions brought 
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by the SEC against internet fraudsters.
128
  Although this type of program worked well in 
the early years of the internet it is doubtful that manual searches will be able to keep pace 
with current activity.  For example, there are nearly 240 million “pump and dump” email 
scams sent every week.
129
 
In addition to the manual searches, the SEC put great emphasis on educating 
investors and having the OIE cooperate with the Office of Investor Education and 
Assistance (“OIEA”).130  In 2000, Laura Unger, a Commissioner with the SEC stated 
We believe that an educated investor provides the best defense -- and 
offense-- against securities fraud. Investors who know what questions to 
ask and how to detect fraud will be less likely to fall prey to con-artists. 
And, because they are more likely to report wrongdoing to the SEC and 
their state securities regulators, educated investors serve as an important 
early warning system to help regulators fight fraud.
131
 
 
One of the main functions of the OIE in furthering this goal was to operate the 
Enforcement Complaint Center, where so-called “cyber-sleuths” have the ability to report 
securities fraud directly to the SEC.
132
  The SEC claims to utilize other programs to assist 
in the search for cyber fraud, however, it has not provided outlines of these programs to 
the public.
133
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 In 2010, the SEC’s Enforcement Division underwent its most massive internal 
reorganization since its inception in 1972.
134
  The OIE was reorganized under the newly 
formed Office of Market Intelligence (“OMI.”).135  Accordingly, it was noted that the 
OMI “will assume the responsibilities of the Internet enforcement unit and add new 
duties, such as handling tips and referrals.”136  The reorganization is not entirely 
surprising as the increase in internet usage for securities transactions is significantly 
greater than when the department originated.
137
  Much like the EDGAR program, the 
SEC initially took the correct step to keep up with the increase consumer utilization of 
the internet.   
The difference in this situation is that the SEC appeared to understand that 
internet usage and securities transactions were so intertwined that the OIE needed to be 
retooled to keep pace.  Unfortunately, because the SEC has not made any information 
available to the public regarding its current tools used to track internet schemes before 
investors are damaged, it remains unknown if the current department has upgraded its 
searching capabilities from the currently outdated ideas such as Cyberforce. 
C. Scamalyrz—A Private Solution Worth Looking Into: 
While the SEC encourages “cyber-sleuths” to report potential online fraud to its 
Enforcement Complaint Center, private parties have taken online fraud detection one-step 
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further.  Scamalyzr is a privately funded and designed “word based text classification 
tool” that is currently used by the New Brunswick Securities Commission.138  It operates 
by searching “a corpus of continuously updated new website instances (retrieved from the 
web) for prevalence of a pre-determined set of relevant words and then ranks them based 
on the presence and frequency of these words.”139  This software has led to investigations 
of suspicious website in numerous countries, including the United States, Canada and 
England.
140
  To date, Scamalyzr has searched over 13 million domains.141 
However, this software is not without its own set of problems.  Due to the text 
base searches based on buzzwords used in fraudulent schemes the software has a 
tendency to produce false positives.
142
  In fact, in certain instances the Scamalyzr 
produced upward of 80% false positive results.
143
  Some of the false positive results are 
attributed to the fact that the programmers are unable to identify what captured sites are 
truly fraudulent until the government brings a fraud action against the individuals 
operating the particular site.
144
  While the results are “far from perfect”145 it is a step 
forward in combating online securities fraud that the SEC has not publicly taken yet.  
The SEC made initial attempts to adapt to the rapid expansion of the internet 
through the installation of the comprehensive online securities registration program 
EDGAR as well as by establishing the OIE to conduct internet sweeps for fraudulent 
                                                        
138
 Laan, Shannon, & Baker, supra note 133 at 3. 
139
 Id. 
140
 Id. 
141
 Id. 
142
 Id. at 4. 
143
 Laan, Shannon, & Baker, supra note 133 at 3. 
144
 Id. at 5. 
145
 Id. 
 24 
activity and increase investor education of potential risks.
146
  However, the SEC needs to 
be more aggressive in keeping up with internet growth.  Programs like Scamalyzr, while 
not without their own faults, are clearly the way of the future of fraud detection in the 
internet.  Simply because of the sheer amount of internet traffic on a daily basis, manual 
web searches and electronic tip centers will be insufficient to proactively track internet 
fraudsters before they are able to execute their schemes and severely damage innocent 
investors. 
V. CONCLUSION: 
 
The SEC has been entrusted to regulate the exchange and sales of securities in 
both the primary and secondary markets.  In the late 1990s, Richard Walker, and John 
Stark expressed different view points on the effect the Internet would have on the SEC’s 
ability to effectively keep up with the evolving technology.  Mr. Walker believed that the 
statutory scheme of enforcement would be more than enough to secure the SEC in 
bringing enforcement actions against online fraudsters while Mr. Stark believed the 
internet posed a great threat to investor security.
147
  Nearly 15 years later it is clear that 
while the SEC has the ability to prosecute internet fraud under the current regulatory 
scheme of the ’33 and ’34 Acts, it is doing so from an increasingly reactionary position. 
 With the total amount of web pages accessed per day nearing 100 billion, the 
increase in attempted fraud has been significant.  Whereas the SEC had brought 
enforcement actions against a total 209 individuals up to the year 2001, it is estimated 
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that currently 240 million “pump and dump” emails are sent out per week.148  
Additionally, the amount of damage done to investors by fraudsters has increased along 
with the number of schemes attempted.  Just this year the SEC came across an internet 
based Ponzi scheme that lost $600 million of investors money.
149
 
 Adding to the SEC’s hardship is its inability to independently bring criminal 
actions against individuals or entities.  Instead, it must work cooperatively with state and 
federal agencies to bring criminal actions against fraudsters.
150
  This requires a great deal 
of coordination between the SEC and other agencies and adds additional due process 
concerns into the framework.
151
   
Moreover, the SEC’s internal policies have not done much to keep pace with the 
internet’s expansion.  The creation of EDGAR does require many companies to file 
financial documents online, however numerous documents cannot be published through 
EDGAR and companies can get around this mandate through hardship exemptions.
152
  
Even its publicly available investigation methods seem outdated.  In 2001 the Cyberforce, 
a group that consisted of attorneys and volunteers, manually scanned the internet 
searching for potential fraud schemes.
153
  Currently, the SEC would be better served by 
implementing technology like Scamalyzr, which uses automated text searches to flag 
potential fraud schemes.
154
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While Mr. Walker may have been correct in stating that the regulatory scheme 
would hold up fine against the onset of internet securities fraud, it appears that Mr. 
Stark’s concerns regarding the internet being the SEC’s greatest enforcement challenge 
accurately reflects the SEC current inability to get in front of online perpetrators of 
securities fraud.  Until the SEC is able to keep up with the rapidly evolving technology, it 
will be playing catch up to fraudsters who will continue to reap incredible profits at the 
expense of innocent investors. 
  
 
 
 
